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RECENT DECISIONS
The second element, failure to exercise due care in the avoidance
of danger, can be determined from the location of the spectator's seat.
A seat so picked by him as reasonably to protect him from pitched or
batted balls, flying pucks or wrestlers would deprive the defendant
of his defense as a matter of law.9
Such is the matter stated generally. "Known danger" is susceptible
to the vagaries of judicial interpretation when methods of injury are
new to litigation. "Due care" becomes hard to pin down when the spec-
tator is more or less deprived of a choice of seats. The whole process
of determining contributory negligence will probably be more flexible
where it is not an absolute defense because of a comparative negligence
statute.
HowAim H. BOYLE, JR.
Torts -Liability Insurance and the Rights of an Unemancipated
Minor Child - A thirteen year old boy was injured when the auto-
mobile in which he was riding, operated by his mother, collided with
another car on a highway in Maryland. Acting by his next friend, the
infant sued his mother for damages. Defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint as failing to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted was denied by the District Court. Held: the defendant's mo-
tion should have been granted since under Maryland law an unemanci-
pated minbr could not sue a parent for injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile accident although the parent was protected by liability insurance.
Villaret v. Villaret 169 F. (2d) 677 (1948).
Two questions are thus presented for review: first, whether an un-
emancipated child may sue his parent for a tortious act and, second,
whether the fact that the parent is protected by public liability insur-
ance would affect the decision of the court.
It is well settled that an emancipated minor child may bring an ,ac-
tion for damages against a parent because of injury to person or prop-
erty, therefore, the two questions mentioned above become important
only when an unemancipated child is involved.'
The first case to clearly deny relief to an unemancipated minor
was Hewlett v. George.2 It was there decided that a child's right of ac-
tion against a parent for personal injury could not be maintained be-
cause it was contrary to good public policy.
The courts which deny relief do not distinguish between an inten-
tional tort and a negligent act. No cause of action has been recognized
9 Supra, note 4 and cases collected in 68 Corpus Juris 875.
139 Am. Jur. 736, note 2.268 Miss. 703, 9 S. 885, 13 L.R.A. 682 (1891); also see excellent article by
Prof. McCurdy in 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030.
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generally for assault,3 for deceit 4 for suit brought after majority for
an act which occurred during minority,5 or for the ravishment of a
minor daughter by her father.6 Some courts have denied the minor
child relief against the employer of the father since the father as a
joint tort-feasor would be liable over to the employer.7 However, suits
of this nature against an adoptive parent, step-parent or one standing
in loco parentis have been sustained in some instances but in all of them
the cause of action was based upon some type of deliberate or malicious
wrong or cruel and inhuman treatment.8 The rule has not been ex-
tended to other family relationships, such as brothers and sisters, for
the courts have allowed recovery where a tort has been committed by
one upon the other.9
The courts have assigned public policy as their reason for denying
recovery in an action for damages by a child against his parent or
parents. Domestic tranquillity would be disrupted where the parent had
to pay the child and also it would be unfair to the rest of the children
to have a portion of the family funds set apart for just one of them.10
In Small v. Morrison" the Court came face to face with the prob-
lem of deciding a case in which the parent was protected by liability
insurance. The Court denied recovery because it feared that the family
unity would be disrupted and that the home would be shattered for a
few pieces of silver. A strong dissenting opinion pointed out that all
the arguments for denying relief no longer existed when an insurance
company would have to compensate the child if the parent was found
liable.
Some courts have indicated that if a suit could be maintained direct-
ly against the liability insurer, a different result might be reached. 2
The minority view was first expressed in the case of Dunlap v.
Dunlap"3 where a minor child was permitted to recover compensation
as an insured servant of the father and the child's disability to sue was
held not to prevent recovery, for family harmony was not endangered.
Although the suit involved an emancipated child, the Court intimated
that it would not make any difference whether a child was emancipated
3 Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924).4 Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924).
5 Note 3, supra, 26 R.C.L. 631.
6 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
7Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W. (2d) 622 (1945) ; contra, Chase v.
New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 A. 107 (1930).8 Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W. (2d) 245 (1939) ; Steber v. Norris, 188
Wis. 366, 206 N.W. 173 (1925); Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206,
61 N.E. 961 (1901).9 Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E. (2d) 254 (1939) ; Munsert v. Farmers
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938).10 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930).
11185 N.C. 577, 188 S.E. 12 (1923).
12Note 11, supra; Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929).
is Note 10, supra.
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or not. The rule of non-liability would not apply in a case where lia-
bility in fact had been transferred from the parent to a third party.
In 1932 a West Virginia court permitted recovery in a suit in
which the parent was covered by liability insurance.14 The Court stated,
"when no need exists for parental immunity the courts should not ex-
tend it as a mere gratuity". In other jurisdictions the rule denying the
infant the right to sue has been abolished. 15
Despite the fact that an automobile insurer might be joined as a
party defendant where there is a "no action" clause in the liability
policy'16 and that an insurer can be held directly liable to the injured
person for damages which he may recover against the insured, 17 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has not relaxed its rule as enunciated in the
case of Wick v. Wick."8 It was there decided, in conformity with the
majority rule, that an unemancipated minor could not recover damages
from a parent for injuries suffered by the minor because of the parent's
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The Court assigned the same
general reasons as other courts for denying recovery, namely that such
actions would impair the peace and happiness of the family, undermine
the home and introduce discord in the relationship between parent and
child. A vigorous dissent pointed out that the Wisconsin Constitution
allows all persons redress for their injuries and that this included in-
fants; further, that the change of times and the common practice of
carrying liabiliy insurance to protect against any civil consequences of
negligence justified a modification of the majority rule.
In 1933 section 204.34 (2) of the Wisconsin Statutes was enacted
providing that no policy of insurance or agreement of indemnity should
exclude from the coverage afforded, or from the provisions as to bene-
fits, any persons related by blood or marriage to the assured. In Segall
v. Ohio Casualty Company9 the Wisconsin Court, in construing this
statute, held that it did not amplify the liability policy so as to entitle
unemancipated minors to recover.
Some courts have intimated that if any changes are to be made, it
is for the legislature to do so. In Fidelity Savings Bank v. Aulik20 the
Wisconsin Court pointed out that the members of the legislature have
had an opportunity to observe the operation of the rule over a period
of years and that while they saw fit to authorize the husband to sue
14Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932) ; see also Worrell v. Worrell,
174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.(2d) 343 (1939).
15 Scotland: Young v. Rankin, 1934 S.C. 499; referred to in 123 A.L.R. 1018;
Canada, Quebec; Civil Code art 1053; Fidelity etc. Co. v. Marchand 4 D.L.R.
913 referred to in 71 A.L.R. 1074.
16 Wis. Stat. (1947) sec. 260.11.
17 Wis. State. (1947) sec. 85.93.
18 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787, 52 A.L.R. 1113 (1927).
19 224 Wis. 379, 272 N.W. 665 (1937).
20252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W.(2d) 613 (1948).
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his wife for damages,- they did not see fit to extend a right of action
to an unemancipated minor against a parent.
When the rule was first enunciated in 1891, the court could not rely
on precedent since there was no common law rule to that effect. The
court was forced at that time to rely on the public policy factor to jus-
tify its decision. If that reason had a justification years ago, it certainly
does not any longer. Years ago suits between husband and wife were
not permitted because of public policy, but now they are generally per-
mitted by statute.
22
Liability insurance is either compulsory by statute or necessarily
essential by virtue of the very great number of accidents occurring
every day in our complex manner of living. When liability insurance
is involved practically all the arguments which might have justified the
majority rule no longer exist. The funds of the family are not depleted
in favor of one child at the expense of the others, family tranquillity is
not disrupted and the parent is not enriched since the funds are usually
held in trust until the child reaches majority. The argument that a
change of the courts' position would open the door to fraud is without
merit. Insurance companies and the courts are forever on the alert for
practices of this kind, if and when they occur, and it cannot be said that
in states where a wife may sue a husband or the husband the wife that
fraud is being practiced on insurance companies and the courts.
The law should be relaxed and modified where the parent is pro-
tected by liability insurance. Of course this would conflict with the
settled principle that the liability of the insurance company is purely
derivative and not primary, but this does not seem to be an important
factor in the cases that have decided this issue. Regardless of how it
is to be effected, by court decision or by legislative action, an unemanci-
pated minor should be permitted to recover for injuries caused by a
negligent parent who has attempted to protect his childrens' interest by
carrying liability insurance. RICHARD B. ANTARAMIAN
Torts - Liability of Landlord for Injuries Sustained by Tenants
from Defective Furniture in Furnished Premises - Plaintiffs had been
renting one of defendant's apartments for fourteen months. Mrs.
Forrester, one of the plaintiffs, sustained personal injuries caused by
the falling of a wall bed in the apartment. She sued defendant land-
lord for negligence, alleging a concealed defect. Held: generally a
landlord is not liable for a tenant's injury due to defective condition
of the premises. If the landlord is liable because of an implied war-
ranty that the premises are fit for habitation, this warranty merely
extends to the premises at the beginning of the term and does not
21 Wis. Stat (1947) sec. 246.075.
22 Wis. Stat. (1947) secs. 246.07 and 246.075.
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